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oaths, that evidence must show scienter on the part of the employee and
in the case of dismissal for use of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in a federal investigation or proceeding, a proper inquiry that
would show the employee's retention to be inconsistent with the best
interest of the state. This is a minimum of protection for the employee
but it is a recognition that some constitutional protection is necessary
and shows some tendency on the part of the Court to liberalize its
past interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment in the area of loyalty
oaths and statutes such as the one in the Slochower case.
CHARLES J. NooE
Criminal Law-Burglary in North Carolina
At common law, burglary was a felony punishable by death ;1 it was
regarded as an infamous offense against the habitation and not against
the property,2 or, as expressed at an early date, ". . . man's house is his
castle, and its security must not be lightly invaded." 3 To preserve this
security the law created safeguards imposing severe penalties on their
infringement. From the common law concept of burglary, however,
a number of statutory crimes associated with burglary have evolved,
each one extending the original scope further into the area of property
protection. Illustrative of this expansion is a recent amendment 4 to
G. S. § 14-54,5 which states where non-burglarious breaking or enter-
ing ". . . shall be wrongfully done without intent to commit a felony or
other infamous crine," (Emphasis added) a misdemeanor has been
committed. This amendment virtually completes the statutory modifica-
tion of crimes associated with the elements of common law burglary.
A brief examination of the development of these related crimes within
the framework of the North Carolina statutes and decisions is the
purpose of this note.
Burglary was defined originally as the breaking and entering, in
the night time, of a dwelling house of another," with intent to commit
a felony therein. 7 Since 1889, the offense has been divided into two
degrees. The gravamen of first degree burglary is that the crime is
14 BLACxSTONE, COMMENTARIES *228.
212 C. J. S., Burglary § lb (1944).
39 AM. JUR., Burglary, 240 (1937) ; State v. Williams, 90 N. C. 728 (1884).
See also State v. Surles, 230 N. C. 272, 52 S. E. 2d 880 (1949).
IN. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 1015; see also 33 N. C. L. REV. 538 (1955).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (Supp. 1955).
6 Under common law, it was immaterial that the occupant of the dwelling house
was not present. State v. Foster, 129 N. C. 704, 40 S. E. 209 (1901) ; 4 BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARES *225.
1 State v. Langford, 12 N. C. 253 (1827). Under common law, it was imma-
terial that the felony intended was not committed, State v. Morris, 215 N. C.
552, 2 S. E. 2d 554 (1939) ; State v. Allen, 186 N. C. 302, 119 S. E. 504 (1923).
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committed when the dwelling house or sleeping apartment is actually
occupied at the time of the commission of the crime.8 Second degree
burglary is the crime committed when (1) the dwelling house or sleep-
ing apartment is not occupied at the time of the commission of the
crime, or (2) when the crime is committed on any house within the
curtilage of a dwelling house, or (3) in any building not a dwelling
house, in which is a room used as a sleeping apartment but is not actu-
ally occupied as such at the time of the commission of the crime.9 From
these statutory distinctions it is apparent that common law burglary
persists today under G. S. § 14-51 (defining first and second degree
burglary) ; other related statutory crimes embrace one or more elements
of the common law concept of burglary and might properly be said to be
derivative.
For example, according to the early concept of burglary, there had
to be a breaking, removing or putting aside of something material which
constituted a part of the dwelling house relied on as security against
intrusion.10 Any force employed to effect an entrance through any usual
or unusual place of ingress was a breaking sufficient in law, but force
or violence was essential. Obviously, this required such acts of force
as knocking a hole in a wall, burning a hole in a house, and breaking out
a window or door to effect an entry, or, under certain circumstances,
breaking an inner door or window, even though entrance to the building
itself was effected without a breaking.'1  This requirement of a violent
or forceful breaking was soon abandoned and breaking was held to be
"any violation of the mode of security," which the occupant had
adopted,' 2 using some measure of force, however slight. Consequently,
unlocking or unlatching a door, lifting a hook with which a door was
fastened, pushing open a door which was shut but neither locked nor
latched, the mere picking of a lock, the turning of a key, and the raising
of a window kept in its place only by its own weight, were adjudged
to be "actual" breaking.13 The element of breaking was extended
judicially by the concept of "constructive" breaking; so that convic-
tion was made possible when, by some trick, the offender entered
through an open door or window,14 or a hole in the wall or roof,15 or
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51 (1953). See also State v. Mumford, 227 N. C.
132, 41 S. E. 2d 201 (1946).
I N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51 (1953). For a development of this statute, see
Laws of 1889, c. 434, s. 1; Rev., s. 3331 (1905) ; C. S., s. 4232 (1919).
1o State v. Boon, 35 N. C. 244 (1852).
i State v. Foster, 129 N. C. 704, 40 S. E. 209 (1901). See also 9 Am. JCR.,
Burglary § 9 (1937); 12 C. J. S., Burglary § 4 (1944); 5 WORDS AND PHRASES
777 (1938).
1 State v. Henry, 31 N. C. 463 (1849).
"3 State v. Fleming, 107 N. C. 905, 12 S. E. 131 (1890) ; State v. Henry, 31
N. C. 463 (1849). See also State v. Madden, 212 N. C. 56, 192 S. E. 859 (1937).
" State v. Henry, 31 N. C. 463 (1849).
15 Ibid.
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where entrance was gained by procuring an occupant by strategem to
remove the inner lock.16 "Constructive" breaking was defined loosely
as an entrance through an open door or window obtained by conspiracy,
fraud or threat of violence. This included the entrance obtained by
procuring the servant or some inmate to remove the fastening,'7 once
even by imitation of a voice of a friend.' 8 It was extended to the
point where it was held that when the defendant encountered the owner
of a dwelling house immediately outside the house at night time, marched
him into the house at the point of a gun and stole money hidden in the
house, the method of entry was held to be a constructive breaking.19
Perhaps the first statute modifying the common law concept of
burglary was the English statute of Anne.20 By this statute, breaking
out of a dwelling house in the night time was made a crime of the same
degree of gravity as breaking in, making the crime of burglary complete
when a person entered a dwelling house by day or night with intent
to commit a felony therein and broke out in the night time.21 This
statute of Anne was incorporated into the statutory law of North Caro-
lina in 1854 and has remained since that time.22  It is important to note
that although the modification of "actual" breaking, "constructive"
breaking, and the statute involving a "breaking out" extended the orig-
inal concepts of what constituted "breaking," they did not change the
requisite elements of burglary. Breaking, whether "actual," "con-
structive," "in" or "out" was essential to the commission of the offense
until 1879, at which time a crime related to burglary was formulated to
eliminate this element. The North Carolina legislature passed "An
Act to Punish the Entering of a Dwelling House in the Nighttime
othernise than by Breaking,"2 3 (Emphasis added) the very title of
which suggests the object: to make indictable the entry into a dwelling
house in the night time by other than a burglarious breaking.24 Under
this section, now part of G. S. § 14-54, a breaking has never been a
prerequisite of guilt, and proof thereof is not required.25
"' State v. Rowe, 98 N. C. 629, 4 S. E. 506 (1887).
17 Ibid.
18 State v. Johnson, 61 N. C. 186 (1865). See also State v. Mordecai, 68
N. C. 207 (1873).
19 State v. Rodgers, 216 N. C. 572, 5 S. E. 2d 831 (1939).
2012 Anne c. 7, s. 3 (1713).
"1 See further 12 C. J. S., Burglary § 15 (1944).
2  N. C. Grx. STAT. §14-53 (1953).3 Public Laws 1879, c. 323; this act amended an act of 1875, which had been
a legislative attempt to extend limited protection to buildings other than dwelling
houses. See State v. Hughes. 86 N. C. 662 (1882).
", State v. Alston, 233 N. C. 341, 64 S. E. 2d 3 (1950) ; State v. Chambers, 218
N. C. 341, 11 S. E. 2d 280 (1940) ; State v. McBryde, 97 N. C. 393 (1886). For
a development of this statute, see Laws of 1874-5, c. 166; 1879, c. 323; CODE, S.
996 (1883); REv., s. 3333 (1905); C. S., s. 4235 (1919); 1955, c. 1015; N. C.
GEr. STAT. §14-54 (Supp. 1955).
" State v. Mumford, 227 N. C. 132, 41 S. E. 2d 201 (1946).
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Both at common law and under G. S. § 14-51, the offense of burglary
is not committed unless there is an entry. However, "entry" does not
require intrusion of the entire body into the building, but may consist of
the insertion of any part thereof for the purpose of committing a felony,
such as a hand, arm, or foot through the place broken.28 Entry of any
part of the body is sufficient if the ultimate intent is to commit a felony,
although the immediate intent may be only to make a further opening for
the body. It is not even necessary that the entry be by any part of the
body. It can be by instrument, as where a hook is put into a dwelling
to take out goods, or a pistol with intent to kill.2 7 There is no North
Carolina case to demonstrate that a breaking without an entry is
sufficient to constitute the offense created by G. S. § 14-54, although it
would probably be sufficient to constitute an "attempt" under either
G. S. § 14-51 or G. S. § 14-54.
Neither breaking nor entering is essential for a conviction under
G. S. § 14-55, s2 originally passed in 1883, which makes it a crime to
make "preparation to commit burglary or other housebreakings," and
includes the possession, without lawful excuse, of implements of house-
breaking, making separate the crimes of preparation and possession.
This statute is designed to allow the apprehension of potential offenders
before their criminal intent is fulfilled by a burglary or an attempt.
Probably the greatest modifications in the concept of burglary have
taken place in the definition of the "dwelling house." Laborious dis-
tinctions have been made in defining which buildings fall within the
definition. Such distinctions as "buildings within the curtilage, '29 or
"buildings appurtenant to the dwelling,"30 and the exceptions to these
general rules were all defined, including a rebuttable presumption that
buildings contiguous to the dwelling were prima facie within the cover-
age of burglary;31 all were utilized to bring the building within the
definition of a "dwelling house," upon which, occupied or not, burglary
could be committed. In 1875, the predecessor of G. S. § 14-54 was
" The North Carolina Supreme Court has not been faced with the delineation
of these borderline areas, since the question has never been raised on appeal.
See, however, 9 Am. JuR., Burglary, § 16 (1937); 12 C. J. S., Burglary §§ 10-12(1944).
19 Am. Jun., Burglary, § 16 (1937); 12 C. J. S., Burglary §§ 10-12 (1944).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. 9 14-55 (1953). For a general development of this statute,
see CODE, s. 997 (1883); REv., s. 3334 (1905) ; 1907, c. 822; C. S., s. 4236. See
also State v. Surles, 230 N. C. 272, 52 S. E. 2d 880 (1949) ; State v. Baldwin,
226 N. C. 295, 37 S. E. 2d 898 (1946) ; State v. Boyd, 223 N. C. 79, 25 S. E. 2d
456 (1943) ; State v. Vick, 213 N. C. 235, 195 S. E. 779 (1938).
2 State v. Wilson, 2 N. C. 202 (1795). See also State v. Whit, 49 N. C. 349(1857).
o State v. Twitty, 2 N. C. 102 (1794).
81 State v. Langford, 12 N. C. 253 (1827). See also State v. Jenkins, 50 N. C.
430 (1858).
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enacted; and in 1889, with the passage of the now G. S. § 14-51,
burglary became a crime of degrees, as follows:
1) Breaking and entering an occupied dwelling house is first degree
burglary, punishable by death ;32
2) breaking and entering an unoccupied dwelling house, or any
house within the curtilage of a dwelling house, is second degree burg-
lary, punishable by life imprisonment or a term of years, in the dis-
cretion of the court ;33
3) breaking or entering otherwise than by a burglarious breaking
into any storehouse, shop, warehouse, banking-house, countinghouse or
other building where any merchandise, chattel, money, valuable security
or other personal property shall be, is punishable as a felony by im-
prisonment of not more than ten years ;34
4) merely being found in "a dwelling, or other building whatsoever,"
with intent to commit a felony or other infamous crime therein, is a
felony punishable by fine or imprisonment ;36
5) breaking into or entering railroad cars containing any thing of
value has been a crime since 1907, punishable by not more than five
years; and this section is accompanied by the statutory presumption
that "any person found unlawfully in such car shall be presumed to have
entered in violation of this section.13 6  Thus, from occupied dwelling
houses to railroad cars, protection has been extended to an ever in-
creasing area. The gradual expansion of protection from the dwelling
to the curtilage to the warehouse to the railroad car demonstrates the
shift to the policy of property protection.
To constitute burglary, the common law required the felonious
breaking and entering to be in the night time, defined as "insufficient
light to discern a man's face."' 37 This is still the law in North Carolina
as to first and second degree burglary. However, it seems clear that
the words of G. S. § 14-54 ". . . otherwise than by a burglarious
breaking . . ." would include a breaking or entering in the day time
as well. This applies to both G. S. § 14-55 ("Preparation to commit
burglary or other housebreakings") 38 and G. S. § 14-56 ("Breaking
22 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51 (1953). 33 Ibid.
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (Supp. 1955).
*1 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-55 (1953). 'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-56 (1953).
17 State v. McKnight, 111 N. C. 690, 16 S. E. 319 (1892). See also State v.
Whit, 49 N. C. 349 (1857).
2" As to the evolution of the now N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54: the original act
(1874-5, c. 166) made no mention of the element of "night time"; however, the
subsequent act in 1879 (1879, c. 323) specifically mentioned "in the night time";
by the time the Code of 1883 (sec. 996) was printed, the words "in the night time"
were omitted. An amending act causing this revision cannot be found in the laws
of 1881, where it would logically seem to be. However, it is a fairly safe presump-
tion that the omission was deliberate.
In the case of the present N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-55, however, the words "by
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into or entering railroad cars") since both specifically omit reference
to day or night time. However, G. S. § 14-5711 ("Burglary with ex-
plosives") defines the crime ". . . either by day or by night."
At common law, a criminal intent to commit a felony at the time
of the breaking and entering was an essential element of the crime of
burglary.40 It was among the few offenses, if not the only one, where
crime in the highest degree was not dependent upon the execution of
the felonious intent. The offense was complete when the dwelling house
was entered with the required intent; what the accused did afterward was
merely evidence of his intent at the time of the entering.41 It was,
therefore, no defense that the intent was abandoned after entry 42 or
before actually being committed; or that the defendant changed his mind
and committed ... or attempted to commit . . . a different crime,43 or
that the circumstances prevented him from carrying out his intent.44
This concept of intent to commit a felony runs through the statutory
crimes associated with burglary as an integral part of first and second
degree burglary, of the crime of breaking out, of the crime of "non-
burglarious breaking or entering," of the crime of preparation to com-
mit burglary, and of breaking into or entering railroad cars. "Intent
to commit crime" is essential under G. S. § 14-57 ("Burglary with
explosives"), while the offense of having implements of housebreaking
requires a negative "without lawful excuse." 45  The latter phrase is
the only apparent effort to depart from the requirement of the proof of
intent until the 1955 amendment to G. S. § 14-54, which made it a
misdeameanor to wrongfully break or enter without intent to commit
a felony or other infamous crime.46
Thus, the full cycle in the breakdown of the common law elements
has been reached. It has been suggested4 7 that the delineation between
first and second degree burglary (depending upon whether or not the
dwelling house is occupied) would suggest a concern for the protection
of life and limb rather than the one-time rationale of the protection of
the security of the habitation. Further, the words in G. S. § 14-54 "....
night," present in the original (24, 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 58) enactment in the North
Carolina Code of 1883, were specifically omitted by 1907, c. 822.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-57 (1953).
40 State v. Spears, 164 N. C. 452, 79 S. E. 869 (1913) ; State v. Boon, 35 N. C.
244 (1852). See also supra, note 7.
"1 State v. Bowden, 175 N. C. 714, 95 S. E. 145 (1918); see also 2 N. C. L.
Rav. 110 (1924).
" State v. Boon, 35 N. C. 244 (1852).
" State v. Reid, 230 N. C. 561, 53 S. E. 2d 849 (1949).
"' State v. McDaniel, 60 N. C. 245 (1864). See further State v. Hooper, 227
N. C. 633, 44 S. E. 2d 42 (1947).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-55 (1953).40N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 1015. See further 33 N. C. L. REv. 538 (1955).
See Statutory Burglary-The Magic of Four Walls and a Roof, 100 U. PA.
L. REv. 411 (1951).
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where . . . other personal property shall be . . ." in context with the
corresponding extensions of the other statutory crimes, suggest that the
true purpose is the protection of property and not the sanctity of the
home.
FRANKLIN A. SNYDER
Criminal Law-Presumption of Coercion-Crimes Committed by Wife
in Husband's Presence
With the exception of certain crimes, when a wife commits a crim-
inal offense in the presence of her hubsand, there arises a common-law
presumption that she was acting under his threats, commands, or
coercion ;1 thus, in the absence of any rebutting evidence, the wife must
go free.2 The two basic requisites to the raising of this presumption are
that there must have been a marriage s and that the criminal act must
have been committed in the physical or constructive presence of the
husband.4 Although there is a tendency in the courts recently to hold
that the presumption is a slight one and more or less easily rebuttable
I State v. Kelly, 74 Iowa 589, 38 N. W. 503 (1888) ; Commonwealth v. Neal,
10 Mass. 152, 6 Am. Dec. 105 (1813) ; Davis v. State, 15 Ohio 72, 45 Am. Dec. 559(1846); 1 BuRnicK, CRIME p. 210 (1946).
2 This defense of marital coercion, even without the accompanying presumption,
is different from the general defense of coercion. In order to obtain benefit of the
general defense, "one must have acted under apprehension of imminent and impend-
ing death, or of serious and immediate bodily harm. Fears . . . of future bodily
harm do not excuse an offense.. ." 1 Buanxcx, CUE p. 262 (1946). A wife
on the other hand is excused if she committed the criminal act under her husband's
coercion, 1 BuD.icK, CRIME p. 210 (1946), which does not require "apprehension
of imminent and impending death, or of serious and immediate bodily harm." The
defense has been allowed when the husband was in jail at the time of the criminal
offense and therefore could have done no more than make threats of future conse-
quences. State v. Miller, 162 Mo. 253, 63 S. W. 692 (1901).
Quaere whether or not the defense of marital coercion and the general defense
of coercion had the same historical basis. The general defense seems to be based
on the doctrine that: "Since every crime requires a willing or voluntary mind, it
may be a defense to a criminal charge that the criminal act was not committed
voluntarily but was the result of coercion, compulsion, or necessity." 1 BuIwicK,
CRIME p. 260 (1946). The basis for the defense of marital coercion is less certain.
One theory is that it is based on the principal that a wife owes her husband the
highest obedience. 1 HAWKINS, PL.AS OF THE CROWN p. 4, n. 7 (Curwood ed.
1824). Others suggest that the defense arose from the practice of granting the
husband benefit of clergy and leaving the wife to bear the harsh punishments that
were administered for relatively minor crimes. 1 BuRoicx, CRIME p. 209 n. 84
(1946).
'Davis v. State, 15 Ohio 72, 45 Am. Dec. 559, 560 (1846).
'State v. Shee, 13 R. 1. 535 (1882). Although it is agreed that the act must
have been committed in the presence of the husband in order for the presumption
to apply, there arises the problem of what constitutes presence within the meaning
of the rule. It has been held in an extreme case that a wife was in her husband's
constructive presence when he was confined in jail and she took him a revolver
to aid in his escape. The court there held that the wife was entitled to the benefit
of the presumption. State v. Miller, 162 Mo. 253, 63 S. W. 692 (1901). It is not
the intention of this note to deal with the problem of presence. See Annot., 4
A. L. R. 266 (1919), 71 A. L. R. 1118 (1931).
[Vol. 35
